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I. INTRODUCTION
What role do lawyers, as lawyers, play in the creation, development,
and maintenance of the international legal order? This is an oddly
underexplored question. It has become increasingly popular to look at
the role various non-state actors—nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), 1 grassroots activists, 2 scientists, 3 insurgent groups, 4 among
many others—play in the shaping of international law. It has also

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to
Tim Meyer, Ingrid Wuerth, and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law.
1.
See Suzanne Katzenstein, Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and
Shaming as a Two-Way Street, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1083–86 (2013)
(discussing the shift towards a consequentialist approach to the “naming and shaming”
of governments by advocacy groups); Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate
Power: A Short Introduction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1101, 1104–09 (2013)
(evaluating the increasingly prevalent role of NGOs as monitors of voluntary corporate
codes of conduct).
2.
See generally KARIMA BENNOUNE, YOUR FATWA DOES NOT APPLY HERE:
UNTOLD STORIES FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM (2013)
(providing stories of men and women from more than three hundred countries who,
through a variety of efforts, challenged muslim fundamentalism and terrorism).
3.
See, e.g., Timothy L. Meyer, Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic
Cooperation in International Environmental Governance, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 1, 19
(2013) (discussing the relationship between scientific bodies and legal institutions in
the context of environmental governance).
4.
See generally Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror,
81 TEMP. L. REV. 787 (2008) (exploring the difficulties inherent in applying the laws of
war to non-state combatants).
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become common to talk in terms of the “disaggregated state,”5 and of
how various substate actors—central bankers,6 regulators,7 judges,8 and
military personnel9—shape international law and policy through their
interactions with each other. Nor have international lawyers ever been
particularly shy about their importance to international law. Oscar
Schacter famously described “the professional community of
international lawyers . . . though dispersed throughout the world and
engaged in diverse occupations” as “a kind of invisible college dedicated
to a common intellectual enterprise.”10 Martti Koskenniemi has written
that “[w]ithout international lawyers, there would have been no
international law.”11 The Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) even recognizes the “teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.” 12 And yet, few have focused on the

5.
See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER (2004)
(describing global governance as an international web of government networks); Peter
J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 195 (2004) (discussing the subnational and transnational forces and actors that
weave the United States into the fabric of international regimes).
6.
See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012) (considering the various actors
who play roles in international financial architecture and who create international
financial rules); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) (describing the role of central bankers in
international financial regulation).
7.
See Zaring, supra note 6, at 550 (discussing regulatory revisions made by
the Basle Committee). See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
8.
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 85–96 (discussing the role of judicial
cooperation in transnational litigation); Erik Voeten, Borrowing and Non-Borrowing
Among International Courts, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 547–48 (2010) (“A growing
literature asserts that national and international judges increasingly communicate
with each other and influence each other’s interpretations of legal issues.”).
9.
See, e.g., PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMAN, POLICING THE GLOBE:
CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163–65, 191–99
(2006) (describing military involvement in domestic law enforcement); Amichai Cohen,
Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International Law
Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law, 26 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 367, 407–11 (2011) (describing transnational networks of military lawyers).
10.
Oscar Schacter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U.
L. REV. 217, 217 (1977).
11.
Martti Koskenniemi, International Lawyers, in THE NEW OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAW 619, 619 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008).
12.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. For a discussion of this specific provision,
see generally Jörg Kammerhofer, Law-Making by Scholars, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW‐MAKING (Catherine Brölmann
& Yannick Radi eds., 2013).
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specific and unique role lawyers might play as state, non-state, and
substate actors in the international system.13
This is an important gap to fill. As Koskenniemi writes, “From
Hugo Grotius to the International Criminal Court, international law
has been a project carried out by international lawyers.”14 And any
account of international law that does not explain the role of lawyers
will necessarily be deficient. This is particularly the case with regard
to the mysterious power of precedent in international law. Regardless
of precedent’s formal role in international law,15 lawyers and judges
regularly invoke it, respond to it, and cite it as authority. 16 Can
studying lawyers help explain when prior interpretations of
international law rules will carry weight, when those interpretations
will frame future arguments, and maybe, when those interpretations
will burden decisions about compliance?
II. THE PUZZLE OF INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT
Precedent presents something of a puzzle for international law.
As a matter of international law doctrine, judicial decisions
construing international law are not in and of themselves law.
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, judicial decisions are
merely “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”17
They are not generally binding on future parties in future cases, even
before the same tribunal. 18 In short, precedent, as a matter of
doctrine, exerts no special force.

13.
As will be discussed infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text, there is a
rich vein of literature on the sociology of law and lawyers that starts with Pierre
Bourdieu and continues through scholars like Bryant Garth and Yves Dezalay. This
literature has, however, made relatively little penetration into international law
scholarship.
14.
Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 619.
15.
See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
16.
See infra notes 19–35 and accompanying text.
17.
ICJ Statute, supra note 12, at art. 38.
18.
Id. at art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”). Technically, Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute is simply a directive to the court laying out the sources states have
agreed it should apply in resolving disputes. That said, the sources listed there are
widely regarded as the sources of international law more broadly. See, e.g., LORI F.
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 56–57 (4th ed. 2001);
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 20–
21 (2d ed. 2001) (“An ordinary starting point for international lawyers from most any
part of the globe when thinking about the formal sources of international law is Article
38 of the International Court of Justice.”); HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS &
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 232
(4th ed. 1994) (quoting the statute and commenting that “[t]his list has significance not
only for tribunals but also for officials or scholars pursuing the inquiries described
above”).
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And yet, precedent is ubiquitous. Reports from international
investment arbitration,19 international criminal law, 20 international
human rights, 21 and international trade,22 all testify to precedent’s
apparent authority. Across international law, practitioners invoke it
and tribunals apply it. This would be remarkable if courts and
tribunals simply cited their own precedent—international law
doctrine requires no such result. But courts and tribunals go much
further (following the lead of international advocates), citing
positively or negatively even the decisions of unrelated courts and
tribunals operating in different areas of international law and with
different mandates. The precedents from one regional body are
argued to others.23 Precedents from human rights courts are argued

19.
See, e.g., Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final
Award, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), reprinted in 6 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 419, 571
(2006) (“In international and international economic law – to which investment
arbitration properly belongs – there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’ rule as in
common law countries, but precedent plays an important role. Tribunals and courts
may disagree and are at full liberty to deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to
maintain that they can and should not respect well-established jurisprudence.”); Susan
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611–12
(2005) (“The fact is that investment awards are not technically precedential. . . . As a
practical matter, however, private investors, governments, and arbitral tribunals rely
on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment treaties.”).
20.
See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International
Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1073–78 (2011) (discussing international criminal
tribunals’ reliance on precedent, such as the Nuremberg model); William W. BurkeWhite, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary
Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 757–58 (2003) (discussing the role of precedent in
international criminal law and noting that “a great deal of deference has been
accorded” to the decisions of the ICTY).
21.
See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203, 1204 (2011) (evaluating the
Inter-American Court’s dynamic interpretation of rights that, “at times, hardly finds a
legal basis in the Convention”).
22.
See, e.g., Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and
Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Specific Disputes
Only or Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 221, 230
(2003) (“If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a basis for determining later
cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without hesitation that large
amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settlement system.”); Raj Bhala,
The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief, there is a body of international common
law of trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body.”).
23.
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights
Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1871–73 (2002) (describing the migration of the
ECHR precedent to other bodies); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
REFERENCES TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3–20 (2012).
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to investment tribunals.24 Precedents from ad hoc criminal tribunals
are applied to domestic civil judgments.25
To see but one example of the pervasiveness of this pattern, take
the landmark Prosecutor v. Tadic case before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 26 Tadic, the
first case heard by the ICTY, produced a range of important decisions
on the jurisdiction of the court, the interpretation of its statute, and
the scope of international criminal liability.27 Those decisions have, of
course, been widely cited in other decisions of the ICTY.28 Not too
surprisingly, other international criminal tribunals have cited these
decisions. 29 The ICJ famously distinguished the test for state

24.
See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie Nappert, Beyond
Fragmentation, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW - IN MEMORIAM
THOMAS WÄLDE 439 (2011) (discussing cases).
25.
U.S. courts have, for example, turned to the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
ICTR to ascertain the standard for aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Compare Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2011), with Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259
(2d Cir. 2009).
26.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
27.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000) (considering the court’s authority to issue contempt orders);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, Tadic, ¶¶ 115–45 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (establishing the test for state attribution);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–6, 55–60, 128–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (considering jurisdiction, role of customary
international law, and scope of liability under the statute).
28.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic & Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37AR72.2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 8, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–6, 55–60, 128–30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995)); Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 148 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000)). The citations are in the hundreds, as a Westlaw
search of the “International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - Combined
(INT-ICTY-ALL)” database attests.
29.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on
Appropriate Remedy, ¶ 46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 31, 2007) (noting
recognition in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) of “certain inherent powers accruing to a Trial Chamber by
virtue of its nature as a judicial body”); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse &
Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-R73, Decision on Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Aug. 5, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 14–49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) in
discussion of the Tribunal’s mandated function and incidental jurisdiction). A Westlaw
search of the “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (INT-ICTR)” database
yields over one hundred citations.
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attribution, “overall control,”30 adopted by the ICTY in Tadic.31 And
the decisions have been cited in dozens of U.S. federal court
decisions. 32 More surprisingly perhaps, International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitration panels have cited
Tadic. 33 It has even made a recent appearance in the U.S.
Department of Justice White Paper on the legality of targeted
killings.34 Even this widespread pattern of citation by entities with no
obligation to do so vastly understates the Tadic precedent’s impact. A
search yields ten times as many briefs mentioning the decision to
U.S. courts as decisions eventually citing it.35 Less formal invocations
of the decision by NGOs and other actors are impossible (or at least
implausible) to count. And, as will be discussed later, the true impact
of a precedent will likely be felt in arguments rather than decisions.
Even citations in arguments cannot capture all the situations in
which actors predict that precedents will carry weight with others
and adjust their actions accordingly.
Existing accounts of international courts and their decisions
have a difficult time explaining these patterns. Traditional accounts
treat precedent as a deliberate design feature.36 States decide at the

30.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43,
¶ 405 (Feb. 26) (“[T]he degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict
on another State’s territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as
international, can . . . differ from the degree and nature of involvement required to give
rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act committed in the course of the
conflict.”).
31.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, Tadic, ¶¶ 145 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“[T]he control of the FRY
authorities over these armed forces required by international law for considering the
armed conflict to be international was overall control.”).
32.
Westlaw Search, ALLCASES, “Tadic.”
33.
See Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad Hoc State-State Arbitration,
Dissenting Opinion of Attila Tanzi at 10 (Jan. 1, 2008) (issuing a dissent from the final
award based, in part, upon Tadic), www.italaw.com/cases/documents/583; Waguih Elie
George Siag, Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15,
Award, at 99 n.453 (June 1, 2009) (citing to Tadic in reference to the idea that there
exists “an inherent power of an international tribunal to deal with any issues necessary
for the conduct of matters falling within its jurisdiction”); Teinver S.A., Transportes de
Cercanías S.A., and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, at 66 n.373 (Dec. 21, 2012) (noting that claimants
urged for the “overall control” test articulated in Tadic to be applied).
34.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE 4–5, available at www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf (citing Tadic
for the proposition that armed conflicts require hostilities of a certain intensity and
duration).
35.
Westlaw Search, ALLBRIEFS, “Tadic.”
36.
See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 22, at 863–68 (describing the codification of
sources in the ICJ Statute and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States as a traditional starting point for thinking about the impact of tribunal
judgments on future disputes); Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment
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outset how much force precedent should have based on their relative
interests in either predictability or control.37 These accounts look to
the constitutive agreements setting up particular courts, tribunals,
and other interpretive bodies, and ask how much authority they
explicitly or implicitly delegate to these bodies and their decisions.38
While accounts based on explicit delegation look to a body’s mandate,
accounts based on implicit delegation look to functional
considerations like the open-endedness of the treaty’s language or
whether the treaty seems to create third-party rights holders.39 Given
that most international law regimes explicitly deny precedent force,40
this former approach has a hard time explaining the reality of how
lawyers argue. The latter do a better job suggesting that some
regimes might be designed with precedent in mind but rely more on
ex ante normative conclusions about precedent’s desirability for a
particular regime than on empirical reality.41 Not surprisingly, their
results are highly contested.
Other rationalist approaches suggest that precedent might
emerge because it is useful.42 In some contexts, states may disagree
over a particular rule, each preferring a particular interpretation over
others. Nonetheless, they may prefer a coordination point over
continued disagreement.43 To the extent third-party decision making
can provide a mutually acceptable rule (i.e., one that provides
sufficient benefits to each party), continuing to hew to that rule may

Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2010)
(describing the orthodox position).
37.
Roberts, supra note 36, at 189 (discussing the balance set in investment
treaties).
38.
Id. at 189–90 (examining investment treaties as an example).
39.
See id. (discussing this difference in the investment tribunal context); see
also Meredith Crowley & Robert Howse, US–Stainless Steel (Mexico), 9 WORLD TRADE
REV. 117 (2010) (describing textual and functional perspectives on stare decisis at the
WTO).
40.
See Bhala, supra note 22, at 863–68; Roberts, supra note 36, at 189 (“Like
the judgments of most international courts, investment awards are not given formal
precedential status.”).
41.
For example, functionalist accounts often suggest that because human
rights treaties are vague and designed to protect third parties, human rights bodies
must be seen as having implicit mandates to fill gaps. E.g., Karen J. Alter, Agents or
Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 33, 38–
39 (2008); see also Crowley & Howse, supra note 39 (making a functional case for stare
decisis at the WTO).
42.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“[I]nternational adjudication can
play a useful role by enabling states to overcome a limited set of cooperation problems
in international affairs.”).
43.
This account essentially posits a “battle of the sexes” game in which
coordination is a dominant strategy, providing obvious benefit over noncooperation, but
where there are multiple equilibria, each providing greater benefit to one party over
others.
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be desirable.44 This explanation treats precedent as epiphenomenal.
A precedent’s force derives solely from the desirability of the rule
reflected in it. Neither its status as the opinion of some body nor its
internal reasoning has any independent effect. Although such an
account may explain the stickiness of some international precedents,
these types of accounts have a hard time explaining precedent in
noncoordination games like human rights. 45 They also struggle to
explain why arguments from precedent would have any force when
the underlying decision goes against state interests.46
More sophisticated rationalist accounts treat precedent as “soft
law.”47 As these accounts explain, from an individual state’s point of
view, its legal obligations are defined by predictions of what others
will consider lawful and unlawful, and precedents can be suggestive
of that.48 States creating a regime can thus use a tribunal to create
rules or adopt interpretations that they would not have been able to
achieve by agreement.49 States reading a court’s views will have to
take into account the possibility that that decision will be treated as
binding law by other states and adjust their calculus and actions
accordingly.50 This account, though, simply assumes that actors will
treat court decisions as predictive of the obligations other states will
hold them to.51 What it does not explain, however, is why.
Finally, still other accounts see the use of precedent as strategic.
Arguing to a body from its own precedent may make it more favorably
inclined to your position. This is true not only for advocates to courts
or tribunals but also for courts or tribunals trying to seek the support
of other courts, something empirical data regarding the European

44.
See Posner & Yoo, supra note 42, at 18 (“[T]he states have a surplus to
divide . . . and the present value of the payoffs from continued cooperation exceeds the
short-term gains from cheating.”).
45.
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899
(2005) (objecting to some of the precedential theories presented in Posner & Yoo, supra
note 42).
46.
See id. at 914–15 (discussing how Posner and Yoo’s theories ignore that
states have increasingly been influenced by international independent courts and
tribunals).
47.
See generally Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International
Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515 (2009)
(using the UN Human Rights Committee as a model to examine why states delegate
power to make soft law to international tribunals).
48.
Id. at 517 (“Although the decisions are binding only on states before the
tribunal, the tribunal’s jurisprudence forms a type of soft law that piggybacks on the
hard legal obligations, and constrains all states subject to the underlying binding
obligation.”).
49.
See id. at 516 (suggesting that tribunal rulings influence state behavior
despite not having binding legal authority).
50.
See id. at 530 (“A tribunal opines on some set of substantive legal rules, and
its rulings affect the expectations and beliefs of states.”).
51.
Id.
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Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), and national court precedent seems to bear out. 52 Such
accounts bring us closer to understanding precedent’s role as
advocacy, but they too fail to capture why advocates regularly cite
precedents from courts other than the ones they are trying to
convince. Perhaps citing other bodies lends prestige,53 but this only
begs the question where this prestige would come from. Why would
particular audiences view certain citations in decisions as carrying
extra weight?
III. FROM PRODUCT TO PRACTICE
Each of these accounts seems to tell part of the story of
precedent’s emergence within international law, but even together
they seem incapable of explaining the utter pervasiveness of
precedent’s attraction. The main deficiency of these accounts is that,
with the exception of the last one,54 they focus solely on the role of
states (as opposed to various non-state actors like lawyers) in
determining precedent’s force. As such, they focus almost entirely on
the formal moments when the state’s role is most obvious: those
moments when the law is made—for example, through treaties—or
applied, when states choose to comply or not to comply, to enforce or
not to enforce. That focus, though, misses everything that goes on
before, between, and after those moments of ratification or
compliance, the ways in which law is transmitted between those
points, and, in turn, much of what is distinctive about law.
What is missing is how law operates as a practice. Law does not
simply provide rules to be followed. Perhaps distinctively, law also
sets the norms for discerning, interpreting, advocating, and debating
the contents of those rules. It provides a set of spoken and unspoken
ground rules that structure an ongoing claim and response over the
applicable law. One party argues for one interpretation of the rules;
another argues for a different one. The law frames which arguments
are better or worse, which arguments will be convincing, and which
will fail.

52.
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 368–69 (1997) (examining the
interplay between the ECJ and the ECHR).
53.
See id. at 325–26 (suggesting that the ECJ and ECHR enhance each other’s
prestige by citing each other’s decisions).
54.
In fairness, Helfer & Slaughter, see supra note 52, were trying to
understand the effectiveness of the ECJ and the ECHR, not the operation of
international precedent, and their approach applied to the question here might
actually yield similar answers as will be noted below. See infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
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If we really want to understand how and why the law develops
as it does, we need accounts of this claim and response process, the
communities of practitioners who bandy over the rules on a regular
basis, and the ground rules these practitioners coalesce around. This
is particularly true of precedent, which, as explained below, seems to
have its greatest impact in legal argumentation.
Elsewhere, I have argued that thinking about international law
as the product of specific communities of practice can help explain the
philosophical, theoretical, and doctrinal differences developing
between different areas of international law,55 such as international
human rights law,56 international criminal law,57 and international
investment arbitration, 58 as well as the emergence of areas of
transnational law almost completely divorced from state control like
global administrative law.59
But imagining international law as a product of these
communities of practice can also help unlock the mystery of
precedent. Precedent is hard to understand as an objective fact
disconnected from any particular group of actors. A prior decision by
a particular legal body is a fact, but how much weight it should be
given in future debates over a particular rule is dependent on how it
is perceived by the actors reading it. Precedent is what Friedrich
Kratochwil60 and John Ruggie61 have described as an “institutional
fact.” Like a “hit” or a “strike” in baseball, precedent is only a fact
within the particular rules of a particular institution or community.62
Just as a student of baseball and a student of cricket will see two very
different sets of facts in a group of people with bats and a ball on a
field, so too will actors biased toward the authority of courts or the
bindingness of precedent perceive the value of a tribunal decision
differently than actors biased toward state consent, state prerogative,
and pragmatism. Different international law regimes—international
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international
investment law, international environmental law, or international
criminal law—may involve different mixes of actors—advocates,
political leaders, diplomats, military personnel, scientists,

55.
See generally Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our
Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1049 (2012).
56.
Id. at 1070–78.
57.
Id. at 1078–84.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 1084–89.
60.
See FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS 25–28 (1989)
(providing a detailed explanation of “institutional facts”).
61.
John Gerard Ruggie, Epistemology, Ontology, and Regimes, in
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY 90–91 (1998) (discussing KRATOCHWIL, supra note
60).
62.
See id. at 91 (quoting John Rawls, Two Concepts of Justice, 64 PHIL. REV. 3,
25 (1955)).
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economists, international lawyers, and domestic lawyers. Each of
these different actors will bring their own professional norms and
biases to the debate, and different mixes of actors will agree on
different norms and operating assumptions. 63 Understanding the
relative weight that different decisions by different bodies seem to
carry in different contexts requires understanding the communities of
actors who might perceive them that way.
IV. PRECEDENT AS ARGUMENT
If we want to understand the weight of precedents within these
communities of practice, one key group we need to understand is
lawyers. Lawyers are members of each of these communities. In some
areas, lawyers dominate the practice; in others, they might not. Do
lawyers play a special role in precedent’s force? Does the relative
presence of lawyers in these areas impact the weight that certain
decisions or interpretations will be given?
It is important here to think more clearly about what precedent
is and what precedent does. What is precedent? Precedent might best
be understood as the burden prior decisions about a particular rule
put on future arguments about the content or meaning of the rule.64
In its weakest form, precedent simply supplies an argument that one
must respond to; one cannot make an argument about the rule’s
meaning without some reference to why the prior decision is right,
wrong, or distinguishable.65 In its strongest form, precedent creates a
strong presumption that the prior interpretation of the rule is in fact
the rule. The question we need to answer is not why actors follow or
do not follow precedent, but instead why it places these burdens on
arguments about the rule.
For lawyers, part of the answer seems to be internal to
understandings of law and legal reasoning. There is a common
intuition, reflected in many theories of law, that one of the core
principles or qualities of law is that it treat like situations alike. Lon
Fuller describes consistency as part of the internal morality of law,66

63.
See, e.g., David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,
26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (2013) (discussing how cultural differences between
humanitarian lawyers and military lawyers might lead them to different
interpretations of “the law of war”).
64.
See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International
Adjudication, 12 GER. L.J. 1005, 1019 (2011) (suggesting that prior decisions can be
seen as creating argumentative burdens in similar situations going forward).
65.
See id. (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is so arbitrary and
artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”).
66.
See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). See also Edwin
W. Tucker, The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller, 40 IND. L.J. 270, 274 (1965) (book
review).
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Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity denies the legitimacy of
checkerboard laws that treat like cases differently,67 and Tom Franck
describes coherence and adherence as key factors in the perceived
legitimacy of laws. 68 From this standpoint, precedent’s pull can be
seen as a direct articulation of rule-of-law norms. If like cases must
be treated alike, future decisions must at least make reference to
prior ones.69 To ignore a prior decision entirely might violate basic
tenets of legal professional ethics.70
The connection to rule-of-law principles gives lawyers strong
normative reasons to give prior precedents at least some weight. This
is true even if we remain agnostic as to whether these principles are,
in Fuller’s terms, part of an internal morality of the law.71 Nor must
we think that lawyers are particularly ethical and pulled toward
precedent because they have internalized rule-of-law norms. These
rule-of-law principles have been deeply embedded into the mythology
of law, are reinforced in the training of lawyers, and are codified in
both implicit and explicit codes of professional ethics. Lawyers may
hew toward precedent simply as a matter of self-interest—a fear of
professional consequences. Internalized professional ethics and fear
of professional consequences are not mutually exclusive explanations;
on the contrary, we should expect them to reinforce one another.
Sociological explanations reinforce these normative ones.
Lawyers, as a professional group, have specific sources of political
and social capital that they can use to maintain their importance and
relevance in relation to other societal actors.72 Among these sources
of social and political capital is lawyers’ purported expertise in
interpreting and applying certain legal sources. This expertise
includes, among other things, stylized forms of analogical
reasoning. 73 Lawyers, seeking to maximize their own power and

67.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–224 (1986).
68.
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L
L. 705, 712 (1988).
69.
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 52, at 319–20 (“In a social or legal
culture that venerates tradition for its own sake, consistency with earlier decisions
provides an autonomous bulwark of legitimacy.”).
70.
See Jacob, supra note 64 (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is
so arbitrary and artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”).
71.
See generally FULLER, supra note 66.
72.
For a broader discussion of lawyers and their political and social capital,
see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1998).
73.
See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845,
892 (2013) (“[A]nalogical reasoning is what judges and lawyers do every day.”); Vicki
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 270 (2001) (remarking that “lawyers and judges, [are]
trained in analogical reasoning both in law schools and in practice”).
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authority vis-à-vis other international actors, will want to emphasize
the value of precedents and their unique ability to understand them.
In other words, lawyers at the U.S. Department of State or
Department of Defense may argue that precedents need to be
followed (a) because they believe that rule of law requires it, (b)
because they fear formal or informal, professional or group sanction
(i.e., shunning) if they fail to adhere to it, or (c) because arguing for
precedent reinforces their authority within decision-making circles.74
We do not need to choose between these reasons; they reinforce one
another.
These normative and sociological explanations suggest that at
least some decisions will carry a certain amount of weight among
lawyers. Although they are too abstract to suggest exactly which
ones, they may hint at some of the factors that might give some
precedents greater pull than others. A broader account of these
factors will have to wait for a (much) longer paper, but some initial
thoughts follow.
Precedents may matter to traditional (nonlawyer) state actors
but in specific ways. For traditional state actors, precedent places a
burden on action to the extent it predicts how other states will react
in the future. It reflects a prediction about state actions rather than
about court or expert reasoning.75 A coherent system of law is not
nearly as important as a coherent account of state actions or
preferences. This means, in turn, that the precedents that have
authority—that carry weight—will be the ones that can best channel
and articulate state preferences.76
An account of precedent as an outgrowth of legal professional
reasoning suggests different sources of authority. If the weight of
precedent results from a legal norm of consistent treatment, then
those interpreters who can wield the strongest legal reasoning—who
are most able to fit their decisions into a greater, more coherent
picture of the law—will place more of a burden on future arguments
than others whose decisions may be less reasoned or that may look
like legal orphans, distinct from the broader legal corpus.
This is suggested by the literature on the effectiveness of judicial
decision making. Larry Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, for
example, have suggested that some of the success of the ECHR and

74.
Cf. Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decisionmaking, YALE. J. INT’L L. 379–381 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the
importance of “who holds the pen” in executive branch legal decision making and how,
depending on the question posed, certain actors may be given the upper hand).
75.
See generally Guzman & Meyer, supra note 47 (reviewing the soft law
effects of international tribunals).
76.
This arguably tracks current debates over the relative weight that should
be given to state practice versus reasoned elaboration. See Harlan Grant Cohen,
International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 249, 280–91 (2013).
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the ECJ is attributable to their tactical use and citation of precedent,
both their own and that of other courts.77 Even more suggestively, in
a recent study of compliance with ECHR decisions, Erik Voeten found
that decisions rendered by ECHR panels made up of a majority of
professional judges were more likely to be complied with than
decisions made by panels whose majorities hailed from other
professions, such as diplomats or politicians.78 Voeten suggests that
this disparity might be explained by the relative importance of
national judges as an audience for ECHR decisions and as compliance
agents in enforcing those decisions at home.79 He hypothesizes that
national judges are more likely to be swayed by decisions that read
like reasoned court opinions and that professional judges on the
ECHR are more likely to write decisions that read that way.80 This is
suggestive of the argument so far that decisions that look more like
judicial decisions (a) better match legal professional norms and (b)
better mobilize a legal audience’s political and social capital by
elevating legal sources and legal reasoning over other
considerations.81
This relationship between audience and authority is important
because it suggests that judicialization and professionalization
reinforce one another. The more courts, tribunals, and expert bodies
in international law, the more legal specialists needed to respond to
them; the more lawyers in the practice of international law, the more
force the decisions of courts, tribunals, and expert bodies will have.
V. LAWYERS AND NORMAL PEOPLE
So far, lawyers have been considered as a single monolithic group,
separate from other potential actors. In reality, lawyers wear many
different hats, and legal professional norms will only be one demand of
them. Their memberships in other communities of actors may carry
other obligations.82 International lawyers, for example, act on behalf of

77.
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 52, at 319–20.
78.
Erik Voeten, Does a Professional Judiciary Induce More Compliance?:
Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, *4–6 (Mar. 27, 2012)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2029786.
79.
See id. (explaining that “national judges have an important discretionary
role” in ECHR implementation).
80.
See id. at *22 (“To the extent that there is a transnational field of judicial
professionals with shared ideas and practices about what constitutes legal justification,
those with practice in this field may be more competent in writing judgments that meet
the expectations of national judges.”).
81.
See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
82.
See generally Luban, supra note 63 (comparing the culture and values of
military lawyers to humanitarian lawyers); Cohen, supra note 9 (describing the various

2013]

lawyers and precedent

1039

the state in foreign ministries, defense ministries, and the military.83
Moreover, different groups of lawyers—domestic criminal prosecutors
and defense attorneys, commercial litigators, members of the U.S.
Judge Advocate General’s Corps—will have different operating
norms. 84 Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 85 a series of
scholars—including Bryant Garth, Yves Dezalay, and Mikael Rask
Madsen 86 —have begun to study the sociology of specific groups of
lawyers operating in different fields and in different countries,
examining their training, their culture, and the social and political
capital they wield in particular political systems. International law
scholars have barely begun to plumb this work, let alone embark on it
themselves. Lawyers are only one type of actor within communities of
practice. The specific norms lawyers as a group bring to the table must
be studied as one piece in a larger mosaic.
Future work might ask, for example, how lawyers interact with
other actors in specific communities of practice to develop the norms
of authority in each—human rights, criminal law, trade, or
investment. The different mix of actors, and the prevalence of lawyers
as a group within each community, 87 should make a difference; it
should change the mix of factors that will be considered in assessing
the law.
Or, future work might explore what happens when preexisting
communities overlap, bringing different community norms into
dialogue or conflict. Some have argued that this is currently taking
place in international investment arbitration where the professional

community memberships of the lawyers in the Israeli Defense Forces’ International
Law Department).
83.
See Schacter, supra note 10, at 217–18 (describing how the invisible college
of international lawyers extends into various governmental capacities).
84.
See generally Luban, supra note 63 (looking at the values of military
lawyers); Cohen, supra note 9 (describing the various community memberships of the
lawyers in the Israeli Defense Forces’ International Law Department); DEZALAY &
GARTH, supra note 72 (exploring the evolution of the values of commercial arbitrators
from various countries).
85.
Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987).
86.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 72, at 18–63 (looking at the sociology of
commercial arbitrators); see also Yves Dezalay & Mikael Rask Madsen, The Force of
Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 433 (2012) (discussing Bourdieu’s model and the sociology of law); YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS (2010) (discussing the role of law
and lawyers in Asia); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN
AMERICAN STATES (2002); GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION,
AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds.,
2002) (cataloguing various tools to understand the exportation of U.S.-oriented “rule of
law”).
87.
This includes whether the principal legal actors are lawyer statesmen like
Elihu Root or broad cadres of professional lawyers.
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biases of commercial arbitration lawyers, international lawyers, and
domestic constitutional lawyers seem to be pulling in different
directions.88 A similar phenomenon may explain debates over rules
regarding the use of force against non-state actors.89 Human rights
lawyers with a bias toward judicial opinions and teleological
interpretations are increasingly in conflict with traditional state and
military actors who continue to look to state practice as the primary
interpretive guide.90
Finally, we might study how lawyers, as citizens of multiple
communities of practice, may act as conduits for normativity between
them, bringing precedents from human rights to bear on investment
arbitration or the law of war. In these pictures, the lawyer is key as
both a state and non-state actor, maneuvering between the demands
of citizenship in professional communities, communities of practice,
and states.91

88.
See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013) (describing the
conflicting analogies different groups of lawyers apply to investor-state arbitration).
89.
See Cohen, supra note 76, at 288–91 (discussing scholars differing views on
the right to use force in self-defense against a non-state actor in another sovereign
country).
90.
See id at 253 (examining disputes over whether gaps in international law
should be settled by state practice or international tribunals).
91.
As Schacter writes, “Individuals who move from one role to another are
unlikely to remain uninfluenced by the ideas and considerations which impinge on
them in their different capacities. The mingling of the scholarly and the official affects
both categories, and often creates tension as individuals move from one role to another
or perceive themselves as acting in the dual capacity of objective scientist and
government advocate.” Schacter, supra note 10, at 218.

